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
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ON THE COVER Special Forces Soldiers meet with Iraqi leaders to gather information and to build relationships. U.S. Army photo



SUBMISSIONS

Special Warfare welcomes submissions of scholarly, independent research from members of the armed forces, security policy-makers and -shapers, defense analysts, academic specialists and civilians from the United States and abroad.

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Special Warfare is an authorized, official bimonthly publication of the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, N.C. Its mission is to promote the professional development of special-operations forces by providing a forum for the examination of established doctrine and new ideas.

Views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect official Army position. This publication does not supersede any information presented in other official Army publications.

Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited and should be addressed to Editor, *Special Warfare*, USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28310. Telephone: DSN 239-5703, commercial (910) 432-5703, fax 432-6950 or send e-mail to steelman@soc.mil. *Special Warfare* reserves the right to edit all material.

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By order of the Secretary of the Army: George W. Casey Jr. General, United States Army Chief of Staff

Official

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Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army

Headquarters, Department of the Army

Recently the U.S. Special Operations Command dedicated its memorial wall and unveiled the names of the 35 special-operations Soldiers who had given their lives during the last year in operations in various parts of the world.

The sober ceremony reminded us of the sacrifices our Soldiers make and the dangerous nature of our operations. When I served as commander of the U.S. Special Forces Command, the hardest part of my duty was attending the funerals of our fallen warriors.

We ask a great deal of the Soldiers in special operations. They must be highly skilled warriors capable of short-notice deployments and able to survive in extremely difficult situations. At the same time, because the ability to understand the human terrain is essential in special operations, our Soldiers must be sensitive to the needs and motivations of the people with whom they work. That requires not only that we teach them language skills and an appreciation of culture but also that we assess them for adaptability.




Those requirements apply in military operations around the world, whether fighting insurgents in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Philippines or conducting foreign-internal-defense operations to help countries defend against drug-trafficking organizations in Central America. Those operations require not only that our Soldiers be highly skilled as warriors and teachers but also flexible enough to adapt the training content and schedule to the needs of the host-nation military. Trust and understanding can be gained only through firsthand engagement with the populace, and our Soldiers must be cognizant of cultural factors so that they can win the respect and trust of the people of the host nation.

In recent years we have made a number of changes to the training at SWCS and to the organization of the schoolhouse itself to place greater emphasis on training in language and culture for Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations and Special Forces Soldiers. We have developed or adapted other courses, based on information from the operational force, to train for other aspects of the ARSOF mission: military free fall; underwater operations; and sensitive site exploitation, which is becoming increasingly important for the collection and analysis of intelligence. We have also worked with the U.S. Army Special Forces command to develop a validation and certification mission-rehearsal exercise that prepares Soldiers for duty on the staff of a combined joint special-operations task force.

As I look back over my two years as commander of SWCS, I am impressed with the excellent job that our Soldiers and civilians at SWCS have done and continue to do to prepare special-operations Soldiers for an exceptionally challenging mission. Leading them has been a rewarding assignment and the best way I could have imagined ending my Army career. It has been my honor and privilege to have served in Special Forces and to have commanded the JFK Special Warfare Center and School.

Major General Thomas R. Csrnko



USASOC NAMES NCO/SOLDIER OF THE YEAR

The bright lights of Hedrick Stadium and a cool morning breeze awakened the competitors on the first day of the 2010 United States Army Special Forces Command NCO and Soldier of the Year Competition that took place at Fort Bragg, N.C., May 3-6.

The 2010 winners, Sergeant First Class Kai Christensen, 10th Special Forces Group, Fort Carson, Colo., and Specialist Derek Safko, 7th SF Group, Fort Bragg, N.C., competed against NCOs and Soldiers from across the five active-duty groups, all vying for the title of SF Command NCO and Soldier of the Year.

"Our goal was to find the Soldier and NCO who will represent the command for the rest of the year," said Command Sergeant Major Mario Vigil, USASFC's command sergeant major. "Through multiple events, we can assess their strengths and weaknesses, and after three days, you can see who will rise to the occasion."

The competition started with the Army Physical Fitness Test, which demands push-ups, sit-ups and a two-mile run. Soldiers panted and guzzled water vigorously after crossing the finish line.

Off in a wood line, the competitors demonstrated their warrior tasks and skills in simulated scenarios. One station required the NCOs and Soldiers to call in a nine-line medical evacuation, while at another they demonstrated

the proper way to wire and detonate a claymore mine. The Soldiers were also tested on their medical proficiency to treat a wounded Soldier.

Later that day, the competitors had to navigate through a wooded area to demonstrate their abilities in day and night land navigation.

On day two, an oral board focused on the military bearing, general military knowledge and appearance of the competitors. During the board, they were challenged with answering questions ranging from general military knowledge to U.S. Army traditions. The judges looked for confidence and zeal in the competitor's answers.

In an effort to push for excellence in the 2010 SF NCO and Soldier of the Year Competition, Vigil requested changes be made to the competition. This year's changes included a live-fire stress exercise that required the participants to effectively discharge their weapon while maneuvering through obstacles.

This exercise also required the NCOs and Soldiers to fire 9 mm handguns at steel-plated circles. The event accounted for time and accuracy to produce the best quantifiable percentage, which went toward the overall score during the competition.

Following the stress exercise, the competitors were tested on their knowledge of level-one Modern Army Combatives skills, with the event concluding in a single-elimination grappling tournament.

"I like the fact that it (the competition) gave everyone a mental challenge," commented Christensen. "The training was awesome. This opportunity was a great way to represent our group, and it was an honor to receive this award."

Master Sergeant Jon Carte, the facilitator of the 2010 NCO and Soldier of the Year Competition, gave insight on the expectations of this year's event.

"Soldiers that are represented here are considered to be the best of the best from their groups," Carte said. "They get to showcase their warrior skills, and this competition also fosters esprit de corps among the NCOs and Soldiers."

The U.S. Army SF Command NCO and Soldier of the Year Competition is held each year prior to the U.S. Army Special Operations Command competition, in which both winners of the SF competition will compete. The winners of the USASOC competition will go on to compete at the U.S. Army NCO and Soldier of the Year Competition later this year.

Vigil told competitors that there can be only one winner, but that each can be proud of the fact that they are still the best within their group and represented their units well by their strong effort in competing against their peers.

SF SOLDIERS WIN BEST RANGER COMPETITION

Two Special Forces Soldiers claimed the title of Best Ranger in the 2010 David E. Grange Jr. Best Ranger Competition.

More than 40 two-man teams began the quest for the title of Best Ranger, but only 25 can say they were able to complete the ultimate Army competition.

"It's kind of like the Super Bowl, the World Series, the Daytona 500, and the World Cup for the Army and the Ranger community," said Command Sergeant Major Dennis Smith, Ranger Training Brigade command sergeant major. "Just to finish it is saying a lot. These competitors are the best of the best."

The competition started with a fourmile buddy run, a 250-meter swim and another three-mile run to their first obstacle course. Following the urban obstacle course, teams had to navigate their way across the camp to firing ranges to conduct a series of weapons-skills events before moving out again on another run. The day ended with a spot jump and concluded with an unknown-distance foot march.

The grueling first day of events and more than 30 miles traveled eliminated nearly half of the competitors. Only 26 teams began the second day's events of completing Ranger skills stations that included rappelling, rope climbs, first aid, hand grenades and additional weaponsskills challenges. The day ended with an overnight land-navigation course.

Competitors were in agreement that it was a relief to have made it past day one, and most were looking forward to the finish line after day three.

"(The first day) was harder this year than last year," said Sergeant Michael Malchow, representing 75th Ranger Regiment. "We are getting stronger as we go on, and hopefully we can get today over with and make up some ground as far as getting up there in the standings."

Day three began with the Darby Queen, an obstacle course laid out on a one-mile route. Upon completion of the course,

teams constructed a poncho raft for use in the helocast event. The helocast event took the teams and their poncho raft over a pond and dropped them. Teams were required to utilize their poncho raft and swim to shore. The day finished with a water confidence test, canoe race and the final run to the finish line.

"Over the past three days, the competitors covered more than 60 miles on foot for more than 60 hours without sleep, and very little food intake," said Captain John Vickery, project officer for Best Ranger. "All those teams that completed the competition are really, really good teams. They represented their units well."

The winning team of Master Sergeants Eric Turk and Eric Ross, representing the U. S. Special Operations Command, raised their hands in celebration as they crossed the finish line.

"It feels pretty doggone good to be able to walk out with the trophy today," said Turk.

NEW WALL HONORS FALLEN ARSOF SOLDIERS

Families and friends of 40 fallen Army special-operations Soldiers gathered with past and present members of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command at the unit's Memorial Plaza at Fort Bragg, N.C., May 27 to remember the sacrifice of their loved ones.

The Fallen Special Operations Soldier's Memorial Ceremony, held every year by USASOC around Memorial Day, is a time for the Soldiers of the command to honor the memory of those comrades lost during the previous year. During this year's ceremony, 35 new names of fallen heroes were added to the Memorial Wall.

"I would like to extend a very special welcome to our gold-star Families," said Lieutenant General John F. Mulholland, USASOC commanding general. "These are our fellow citizens, our neighbors, many of whom are veterans of service to our great nation themselves. They have provided to our nation that most precious of sacrifices: their sons, their husbands, their brothers and fathers. These are the very men who have brought us together here today. You honor us with your presence."

The names of fallen special-operations Soldiers dating back to the Korean War have been recorded on the USASOC Memorial Wall since 1994. This year, the wall underwent a reconstruction and was dedicated in the ceremony as the Fallen Special Operations Soldiers Memorial Wall.

"We undertook a collective effort with our friends this year to build a new wall, an edifice which we felt would be more fitting to remember and honor our great warriors, knowing that in no way can we fully do justice to their ultimate sacrifices," Mulholland said.

Mulholland highlighted the efforts of many people instrumental in the development and construction of the wall, saying, "Throughout this project, what was foremost in the minds of all those people who participated was the sacrifice of our fallen heroes. That is what motivated everyone to make this a reality."

Such projects do not fall from trees, he said, but rather are enabled by great American patriots who invest in these visions to make them real.

"To all these great men and women, and all those who have helped make this wall a reality, I thank you," he said. "We will never lose sight of the fact that this is but a mechanism to recognize the real reason we are here today, that is honor these great Soldiers."

Once the wall had been unveiled, each major subordinate operational unit's commanding officer and command sergeant major placed a wreath at the base of the memorial. Then, as the names of the Soldiers who died during the past year, as well as five who died in previous years, were read off by each unit's command sergeant major, silence took the crowd and only the ringing of a lone bell could be heard.

"Today we stop to honor a very special group of Army special-operations Soldiers: those who sacrificed all for their fellow man," Mulholland said. "These are men who had choices. They were extraordinarily talented and intelligent men who could have done anything they wanted to do."

When a nation is fighting a war for more than nine years, "You don't stay in this kind of formation unless you have a passion for it, and these were passionate men," he said. "These are men who loved what they did and knew they were making a difference in the most dangerous missions around the world on behalf of all of us. They, of their own voli-



VLTIMATE SACRIFICE ARSOF Soldiers gathered at the USASOC Memorial Wall to pay honor to their fallen comrades. U.S. Army photo.

tion, their own desire, took on our toughest challenges in the toughest locations on behalf of this great country."

Mulholland closed with the reading of the inscriptions that are etched into the wall.

"I think they speak perfectly to its purpose and together say all that needs to be said," Mulholland said. "One is from John, which reads, 'Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends.' No other words could possibly make clear the ultimate purpose behind the sacrifice made by our fallen heroes: their love for their fellow man, and their love for their country."

Below is the main inscription located on the front of the wall:

"Welcome Kinsman, Comrade, Friend. Recorded here on this humble Wall are the names of our fallen Heroes. They were and always will be cherished Soldiers of Army Special Operations, our comrades in arms. Know that they eagerly sought and accepted our Nation's most difficult missions against our most dangerous enemies. Know that they willingly endured hardship and danger, and at the end, sacrificed all for us. With solemn pride, know that in doing so they proved true to their oath to the Constitution and duty to the Citizens of the United States of America. To them, their example and their memory we humbly dedicate this Memorial."

HONORARY LEADERS OF THE REGIMENT INDUCTED AT 2010 SPECIAL FORCES SYMPOSIUM

On April 15, the 1st Special Forces Regiment inducted three of its own as its honorary leaders during the SF Symposium banquet at the Crown Coliseum in Fayetteville, N.C.

Taking up the reins of leadership were Major General (Retired) Sidney Shachnow as the honorary colonel; Chief Warrant Officer 5 (Retired) William A. McPherson as the chief warrant officer of the regiment; and Sergeant Major (Retired) Ernie Tabata as the sergeant major of the regiment.

As the honorary leaders of the regiment, the three are charged with keeping the regiment's heritage. In their honorary roles, they will serve a ceremonial and a teaching role in the regiment. They will attend numerous ceremonies and will be available to talk with units and Soldiers about the history and honors of the regiment.

Major General Sidney Shachnow

Major General Sidney Shachnow was born in Kaunas, Lithuania. At the age of six, he was imprisoned for three years during World War II in a German concentration camp before being liberated by the Soviet army. He lived in Europe until he emigrated to the United States in 1950. He enlisted in the Army as a private in the Infantry and later attended Officer Candidate School as a sergeant first class. He was commissioned as a lieutenant in Infantry in 1960. In 1962, he volunteered for Special Forces.

His assignments during more than 34 years of commissioned service have been as a commander or staff officer with Infantry, mechanized infantry, airmobile, airborne and Special Forces units. He served as a Green Beret for 32 years. Major General Shachnow retired after 40 years of active service on Oct. 1, 1994. He serves as the chairman of the Veterans of Special Forces. In 2004, he published the best seller *Hope and Honor*, which chronicles his life from his dramatic upbringing in war-torn Lithuania through his many



↑ DISTINGUISHED LEADERS BG Michael S. Repass (second from left) and MG Thomas R. Csrnko (right) prepare to install the newest honorary leaders of the Special Forces Regiment during the 2010 SF Symposium. The new leaders are (left to right): MG (Retired) Sidney Shachnow, CW5 (Retired) William McPherson and SGM (Retired) Ernie Tabata. U.S. Army photo.

years of military service. In 2005, his book was awarded the prestigious Colby Award.

Chief Warrant Officer 5 William A. McPherson

Chief Warrant Officer 5 William A. McPherson entered the Army in October 1972 and served as a paratrooper in the 82nd Airborne Division. He was assigned to the 10th SF Group in May 1977 and remained with the 10th SF Group for more than 26 years. In December 1986, he was appointed an SF warrant officer.

McPherson held numerous positions within the group, from intelligence sergeant to group operations officer. He later was assigned to SWCS as the chief warrant officer of the 180A Branch within the then-Directorate of Special Operations Proponency. McPherson retired from military service in October 2008.

Sergeant Major Ernest K. Tabata

Sergeant Major Ernest K. Tabata began his military career in June

1946 as a volunteer in the Hawaiian Territorial Guard. Two years later, he enlisted in the U.S. Army at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, and completed the advanced combat engineer school at Fort Belvoir, Va.

Tabata was among the first American Soldiers sent to South Korea to repel the invasion by North Korea. Following service in Korea, Tabata returned to Hawaii and received an honorable discharge in September 1952. He re-enlisted in the Army in January 1955 and was assigned to the 82nd Airborne Division. In January 1961, he became a "triple volunteer," applying for duty with the Special Forces. He served in Operation White Star and later in Vietnam, where he trained the Montagnards and served with the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam-Studies and Observation Group, or MACV-SOG.

Tabata retired in December 1981 after 30 years of active service. To-day he is an instructor with the 1st Special Warfare Training Group.

A FLEXIBLE FORCE:

New Training Adds to Soldiers' Toolbox by Kurt Ailerson

One of the many traits essential to special-operations forces is flexibility. The ability to adapt to an ever-changing battlefield environment is critical if our forces are to stay a step ahead of our adversaries. That flexibility begins with training that ensures that Soldiers conducting special-operations missions will have the knowledge, skills and abilities that enable them to be successful in the current and future operational environments. In order to meet that challenge, the Advanced Skills Branch, Training Development Division, or TDD, of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, or SWCS, is working to develop a number of new courses, based on new requirements from the operational force.

Special Operations Forces Sensitive Site Exploitation

In 2008, the United States Special Operations Command, or USSOCOM, established Special Operations Forces Sensitive Site Exploitation, or SOFSSE, as a program of record. SOFSSE is built on three pillars: biometric-enabled intelligence; forensic-enabled intelligence; and document- and media-enabled intelligence. The USSOCOM program establishes five levels of SOFSSE that range from the collection of information at the tactical level to exploitation by Department of Defense-level assets. These levels are operator basic, operator advanced, enabler, exploitation analysis centerorganic and exploitation analysis center-reachback. SOFSSE has become increasingly important, and the demand for qualified operators has escalated. With U.S. Central Command's increased requirement for SSE, the demand for SSE capability and capacity will continue to grow.

The contribution of SWCS to the growth of the SSE capability is to ensure that every SOF servicemember is fully trained to conduct SOFSSE duties appropriate to the level at which they operate. SWCS has developed a training-support package, or TSP, for SOFSSE operator basic that is to be integrated into each SOF entry-level course in fiscal year 2010. SWCS is also introducing three new SOFSSE courses for FY 2010: the Operator Advanced Course, the Enabler Course and the Exploitation Analysis Center-Organic Course.

SOFSSE Operator Advanced Course

The SOFSSE Operator Advanced Course, or OAC, is a three-week program of instruction that will teach 11 24-student classes per year. The target audience for OAC is detachment-level operators from all SOF components. The course will qualify selected officers, warrant officers,

NCOs and U.S. government civilians to perform SOFSSE functions at the operator advanced level in support of SOF missions across the operational continuum. OAC focuses on SOFSSE conducted on the target, and the majority of training is hands-on, scenario-driven practical exercises designed to challenge the students. Students will learn the basics of collecting and documenting items of evidentiary or intelligence value on-target. However, the OAC is designed to take students beyond simply "bagging and tagging" items that are handed over to someone else for exploitation.

The OAC student will learn how to conduct the initial triage of materials or personnel and how to sort and prioritize those items or personnel of important intelligence or evidentiary value, based on intelligence requirements. Students will also be trained in team organization and responsibilities; planning; interagency collaboration; exploitation of biometrics, forensics, documents and media; IED exploitation; tactical questioning; and detainee-handling procedures.

SOFSSE Enabler Course

The SOFSSE Enabler Course, or EC, is a three-week program of instruction that will teach 11 classes of 35 students annually. The target audience for the EC is composed of personnel in military intelligence, interrogators or Soldiers assigned to chemical or explosive-ordnancedisposal units detailed to assist in SOFSSE. EC's purpose is to train students to conduct specialized SOFSSE activities that are beyond the capabilities of the SOFSSE advanced operator. EC students will learn to operate within a SOFSSE facility designed to further exploit sensitive-site materials and detainees who have been removed from the objective. Students will learn basic and advanced operator tasks to enable them to assist SOFSSE advanced operators on-target. The EC will provide training in advanced battlefield forensics; on-site presumptive identification of trace and residue; detection, capture and transfer of latent prints with or without dusting; imaging, storing and exploitation of large volumes of digital media; employment of ballistic imaging devices; and advanced document digitization.

Exploitation Analysis Center-Organic Course

The Exploitation Analysis Center-Organic Course, or EAC-O, is a two-week program of instruction conducted in four iterations of 16 students annually. The target audience for EAC-O will be SOF military-intelligence personnel



A FLIPPED OUT SF Soldiers attend the SF Combat Diver Qualification Course, or SFCDQC, in Key West, Fla. SFCDQC is one of 17 advanced-skills courses offered at the USAJFKSWCS. U.S. Army photo.

and personnel assigned to chemical or explosive-ordnance units who have been detailed to assist with SOFSSE. The purpose of the EAC-O is to train students in the duties and responsibilities of the exploitation analysis center-organic. The EAC-O graduate will be capable of using advanced equipment to perform detailed analysis and exploitation in a laboratory environment. Students will be trained in the roles and responsibilities of the EAC-O technician; collection and submission of SSE materials; digital photography; tool markings; impressions; firearms comparison; postblast investigation; and analysis of drugs, explosives and chemicals using gas chromatograph and mass spectrometer technology.

Advanced Special Operations Manager's Course

The Advanced Special Operations Manager's Course, or ASOMC, will train and certify selected graduates of the Advanced Special Operations Techniques Course, or ASOTC, in the concepts, responsibilities, functions, procedures and organizational structures associated with the effective management of USSOCOM advanced special-operations activities. ASOMC is a classified program of instruction designed to provide ASOTC graduates with the skills and knowledge

necessary to plan, task, manage, coordinate, synchronize and deconflict advanced special-operations activities up to the joint-staff level, in all operational environments. The course will be from two to three weeks long and should produce approximately 96 ASO managers annually. Classes are expected to begin during the first half of FY 2011.

Special Forces Technical Surveillance Course

The Special Forces Technical Surveillance Course, or SFTSC, is designed to qualify selected special-operations personnel in the concepts, responsibilities, functions and procedures associated with technical-support operations for SOF missions across the spectrum of operations. The graduate will possess an intermediate-level skill set with knowledge required to effectively conduct technical-support operations that will provide a force multiplier for SOF commanders. The course will train SOF operators in the use and exploitation of tactical assets for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, or ISR. Students will also be trained in target development using advanced digital photography and video equipment. SFTSC will run three 24-student classes annually and is scheduled to start in August.

Special Forces Combat Diver Qualification Course

In January, the Special Forces Combat Diver Qualification Course, or SFCDQC, implemented a number of changes designed to transform it into a more tactical dive course that better meets the needs of the force. The changes were the result of a critical-task site-selection board that TDD conducted in October 2009. The board recommended that the course remain five weeks long, but that pool training be reduced from three weeks to one week. The savings in training time allowed the course to implement the board's other recommendations: SFCDQC has added 12 more closed-circuit dives, including turtle-back dives (combining surface swimming on the swimmer's back with underwater closed-circuit swimming), team dives with equipment, dives with the MK48 mask, dives using the new communication system manufactured by OTS, dives using the diver-propulsion device and working or search dives. SFCDQC has also added four days of training with combat rubber raiding craft and one day of kayak training. Teams now plan and conduct a double-duck operation (deploying, by parachute, two rubber boats bundled together) and helocast into a turtle-back dive and a beach landing site. To compensate for the loss of two weeks of pool training, each SF group now conducts a two-week pre-Scuba course, similar to the ones units have conducted in the past, which is a prerequisite for the SFCDQC. SFCDQC students must arrive for training in Key West with a memorandum, signed by their group dive supervisor and the dive supervisor who conducted the pre-scuba training, stating the Soldier has passed all the graded events in pre-Scuba.

Military Free-Fall Advanced Tactical Infiltration Course

Recent combat infiltrations in Iraq and Afghanistan using military free-fall, or MFF, has highlighted the need for advanced training in MFF tactical infiltration that is not provided in other MFF courses. The MFFATIC is a threeweek program of instruction that will instruct 10 classes of 12-15 students annually at Yuma Proving Ground, Ariz. MFFATIC training will qualify selected MFF jumpmasters as subject-matter experts in advanced MFF tactical-infiltration techniques. They will return to their units to conduct unit training for MFF personnel. Students will be trained in the skills required for advanced, nighttime standoff infiltration (high-altitude, high-opening, or HAHO), computer-guided and compass-driven naviga-

tion, night-vision rigging and

emergency procedures, rigging of nonstandard combat equipment and weapons, grouping and canopy flight into unmarked or blacked-out drop zones, and the rigging, loading and deployment of GPS-guided bundles. Students will plan and execute several nighttime, oxygen HAHO operations, from 25,000 feet, using night-vision goggles in complete blackout conditions and navigating onto unfamiliar or unmarked drop zones. The course is scheduled to start later this year.

Special Forces Intelligence Sergeant Advanced Course

For SF operational detachments, intelligence has become one of the most critical factors on today's battlefield. The migration of some of the most critical intelligence products to the classification of top-secret/sensitive compartmented information, coupled with deployed units' lack of access to robust military-intelligence support from higher headquarters elements, has created the need for detachment intelligence sergeants to receive advanced training.

In June 2009, SWCS conducted a critical-task siteselection board at Fort Bragg to determine the critical tasks for an SF intel sergeant advanced course. The course will last from three to six weeks and will conduct four 30-student classes annually. Students will be trained in the use and exploitation of joint- and national-level intelligence-collection platforms and assets; mining databases in the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System and Defense Common Ground System-Army environments; advanced geospatial functions; operations in a joint intelligence staff section; use of the ISR assets of DoD and other U.S. government agencies; fusion-cell activities; and information operations for targeting. Graduates will also be certified in the use of credibility assessment tools. The course is expected to begin during FY 2011.

As the courses come online, class slots will be available through the Army Training Requirements and

Resources System. SWCS continues to develop or adjust training based on requirements identified by the operational force, ensuring that our forces are prepared to engage our adversaries in any environment and win and proving once again that SWCS is the premier special-operations training organization in the world. SW

Kurt Ailerson is a training specialist with the SWCS Training Development Division, Directorate of Training and Doctrine. As an SF intel sergeant, he served in the 3rd and 5th SF groups. As an officer in Military Intelligence, he had assignments in conventional and special-operations units.



^ MISSION READINESS Soldiers preparing to deploy take advantage of the Army Special Operations Battle Command Training Center to: enhance synchronization of operations at all levels, exercise the staff's ability to coordinate, plan and direct operations with subordinate and lateral headquarters, and exercising the unit's staff battle drills. *U.S. Army photo*.

PRACTICE MAKES PERFECT

Mission Rehearsal Exercise Prepares Soldiers for Deployment by Major Mark Stoddard

When Special Forces groups deploy to Iraq and Afghanistan, they form the nucleus of the combined joint special-operations task force, or CJSOTF, that controls all special-operations activities in country. Because of the high tempo of operations in both countries, the new CJSOTF staff must be able to switch into the run mode immediately after assuming their new reponsibilities.

To assist units in conducting their pre-mission training, the Army Special Operations Battle Command Training Center, or ARSOBCTC, together with the U.S. Army Special Forces Command, recently established a validation and certification mission-rehearsal exercise, or MRX, to help prepare Soldiers for service on a CJSOTF staff. The ARSOBCTC, part of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's Army Special Operations Capabilities Integration Center, is the hub for all ARSOF battle-command training and the only organization within the United States Special

Operations Command available to conduct CJSOTF-level MRX events. The MRX is conducted by the ARSOBCTC's Battle Command Exercise Division, or BCED, while the SF Command schedules all MRXs and prioritizes units' attendance to ensure that units closest to deployment will be trained first.

Each CJOSTF MRX is built around the commander's objectives in training his staff for combat operations. Specific areas of focus include: enhancing synchronization of operations at all levels, exercising the staff's ability to coordinate, plan and direct operations with subordinate and lateral head-quarters, and exercising the unit's staff battle drills.

A typical CJOSTF MRX takes place over four or five days and consists of more than 500 event-based injects, or contingencies, that are written based on current research by the BCED staff and input from the SF group being trained. The BCED uses a crawl-walk-

run methodology to obtain maximum training benefit. The members of the BCED staff act as training facilitators, while the pace at which events are injected into the MRX can be increased or decreased by the commander. Units conduct after-action reviews, or AARs, daily, with the BCED staff providing general observations.

Realism is essential for a successful training event. During the MRX, event-based injects are sent just as they would be sent in theater: via satellite radio, mIRC chat, e-mail and SCAMPI phone. In addition to portraying real events, the MRX also uses the unit battle roster to add realism and relevance. Use of unit names during an MRX often has a profound impact: When troops-in-contact events are part of the exercise, the floor of the joint-operations center often becomes hushed as statistics on friendly casualties are announced.

As part of the validation process of

each CJSOTF MRX, the commander of the Army SF Command, Major General Michael Repass, visits the unit during the exercise to assess the staff's proficiency and provide his battle-command philosophy and certification. Successful information management and control, along with the establishment of good lateral relationships within the CJSOTF, are some of his key themes.

World-class validating MRXs that will prepare a CJSOTF staff for full-spectrum overseas contingency operations require approximately 90 days of preparation to develop a new area of operation. Key to providing the CJSOTF staff with the depth they need to exercise all areas is obtaining near real-time information and situational reports from theatre as well as integrating trends, actual lethal and nonlethal events, and current intelligence into the exercise planning and process. To do successful research, the BCED staff works closely with CJSOT-Fs in theatre to gather the information needed to run relevant exercises.

For most CJSOTF MRX's, coordination is made with the J7 of the Special Operations Command-Joint Forces Command to conduct academic training with the unit the week prior to the MRX. That training involves the areas of command and control, information operations, communications, intelligence, interagency coordination, logistics support and incorporating lessons learned from recent in-theater observations.

One of the challenges of the BCED is fitting the entire set of event injects into a typical MRX training day from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. MRX training days are limited because of the number of BCED contract staff available to conduct the training. Replicating the effect of events that occur during nighttime hours is particularly difficult because of this constrained timeframe. To meet these challenges, prior to the MRX, the BCED works extensively with the SF

group being trained. The BCED holds initial, mid and final planning conferences with units prior to the MRX to complete all coordination necessary to ensure a successful training event.

The BCED possesses the capability to conduct CJSOTF MRXs by three methods: distributed, exported and home-station. The most common method is home-station, during which units come to the ARSOBCTC to be trained.

A distributed MRX occurs over the secure ASOC Net. During a distributed MRX, the BCED runs the exercise from Fort Bragg, while the unit sets up its tactical operations center at its home station. The BCED sends two or three personnel forward during a distributed MRX. Those forward-based personnel provide the unit with digital training and assist during the MRX with any technical issues.

An exported MRX occurs when the complete BCED staff moves to the trained unit's home station to conduct the MRX, taking with it all digital equipment necessary to execute the MRX.

Prior to each CJSOTF MRX, the BCED works with the unit being trained to identify the unit's requirements for digital training. That ensures that once the unit is in-theater, it will be able to operate the systems being used, including Command Post of the Future, Command and Control Personal Computer, Falcon View, mIRC Chat, Tactical Local Area Network, Force 21 Battle Command Brigade and Below, and other digital systems. Unit digital training is typically conducted the week prior to the MRX to minimize any operator issues that could hinder unit reaction time during the exercise. In an effort to ensure that units are trained on the appropriate digital systems, the BCED routinely surveys CJSOTF staffs in theater for digital equipment in use.

The BCED incorporates the latest simulations available into each MRX. One of the simulations is a Predator feed that can be used as either a direct-action or reconnaissance asset.


The simulation was developed in-house by the BCED staff, using the Virtual Battle Space II simulation. It can be tailored to unit requests and has multiple branches and sequels that the commander can choose from to increase or decrease the stress placed on his staff during the MRX.

In the future, the BCED plans to conduct a larger number of distributed MRXs and, at the invitation of theater-based units, to send BCED contract staff into theater to gather data. It also wants to work closer with unit staffs upon redeployment to incorporate lessons learned and to increase the use of simulations during exercises.

ARSOBCTC's future training should be enhanced by a new USA-SOC BCTC facility being funded by the Army's Battle Command Training Support Program, or BCTSP. The 46,000-square-foot facility is on the **BCTSP Military Construction Project** List, and construction may begin as early as fiscal year 2012. Once in the new facility, the BCED plans to more than double its staff to more than 80 personnel, which will allow it to conduct around-the-clock MRXs, and perhaps send BCED staff members with deploying CJSOTF staffs to significantly improve future CJSOTF MRX training. **SW**

Major Mark Stoddard serves as simulations officer for the JFK Special Warfare Center and the U.S. Army Special Operations Command. His previous assignments include being director of the Army Special **Operations Battle Command Training** Center; duty with the 3rd Battalion, 3rd SF Group; the 1st Corps Support Command; and the Airborne and Special Operations Test Directorate. His overseas assignments include a one-year tour in Korea and a deployment to Afghanistan. In addition to being a graduate of the Civil Affairs Officer Course, Major Stoddard holds a bachelor's in mass communication from the University of Utah.





A critical imperative of Army special operations is the ability to understand the operational environment. In an environment as complex and challenging for United States military personnel as Iraq, the capacity to thoroughly understand the human terrain and civilian influence within a region is essential to attaining mission success.

That understanding should be applied to all levels of the Iraqi populace, whether Soldiers are working with high-level government official, a recently enlisted Iraqi Army soldier or a farmer residing in the most rural of locales. When encountering such diverse groups and personalities, it's imperative to realize that rarely do two groups, no matter how similar they may appear on the surface, share identical goals or motivations.

Only through routine personal interaction can we gain an understanding of the wants (levers of influence) specific to an individual or group of individuals. These levers of influence can then be used to orchestrate support for the objectives of U.S. Special Forces at the local, provincial and national levels. Knowing these motivations significantly enhances the possibility of achieving long-term security and stability in a region. The SF operational detachment-alpha, or SF ODA, through its access and placement, has to determine the official and unofficial hierarchy, the region's levers of influence, and how to effectively "hire" the region's people by applying those levers.

In January 2008, ODA 0326, from the 3rd Battalion, 10th SF Group, Fort Carson, Colo., received orders to deploy to the Shiite-dominated city of Ad Diwaniyah, Qadisiyah Province, from May 2008 through January 2009 in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom VI. The Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force – Arabian Peninsula, or CJSOTF-AP, through its established lines of operation, expected the ODA to enhance the capabilities of Iraqi security forces through foreign internal defense, expand and develop the networks of influence, target enemy networks within the designated area of operations, or AO, and conduct combined lethal operations through an established partnership with local security forces.

ODA 0326 realized that to accomplish such a wide range of tasks would require a change in standard tactics and approaches. The detachment judged that developing access and placement through networks of influence, even in rural areas rarely frequented by coalition forces or Iraqi security forces, was an essential element in accomplishing the mission. Traditionally ignored by the Iraqi security forces and having little or no coalition presence, these rural regions remained primarily in the control of tribal

leaders. Coalition forces had some success in engaging tribal leaders residing within the province, but with the constant rotation of forces, variations in units' priorities and ever-changing methods of operating in the environment, the success had not been sustained.

Based on previous intelligence and reporting, the ODA predicted that the greatest concentration of anti-Iraqi forces, or AIF, within Qadisiyah Province would be found in the secluded rural regions. Between May and November 2008, "Operation Lion Pounce," a citywide clearing operation in Diwaniyah, devised by the leaders of the 8th Iraqi Army, dealt a heavy blow to the extremely active militia of Jaysh Al Mahdi/Special Groups. While the operation's direct-action operations resulted in arrests of key militia personnel, its primary success was in ridding Diwaniyah of AIF. Following the operation, as a result of rigorous security maintenance conducted by both the Iraqi security forces and coalition forces, the AIF cells that had traditionally operated in the region were denied the ability to operate within the city limits and were forced to relocate to the outlying areas of the province.

ODA 0326 viewed the province's tribal population, which maintains a tremendous influence in the rural locales, as an untapped resource and realized that engaging the population could have significant effects along multiple lines of operation. Whereas government, political and military officials have a shelf life only as long as their election or careers, tribal leaders habitually enjoy greater longevity than any other officials. By engaging tribal leaders and citizens who speak for a large number of constituents, the ODA had an opportunity to gain ground truth and an understanding of tribal needs, stances and motivations.

Tribes and influential tribal leaders are significant not only in rural or secluded regions: While tribal influence fluctuates dramatically throughout Iraq, it remains present in some aspect nearly everywhere. Often entire cities are bracketed by the tribal make-up within neighborhoods. Successfully engaging tribal leaders can help foster a pro-coalition attitude, both in urban neighborhoods and austere rural areas rarely patrolled by security forces. Tribes are a network within themselves. Even what appears to be a primitive or politically insignificant tribe possesses potential ties to influential elements or individuals within the AO. Recognizing the flow of information that occurs among tribal members, the ODA first sought to establish a positive relationship with the tribes. An effective relationship with the tribes could increase the number of eyes and ears assisting coalition forces into the thousands.



A FAMILY DINNER American Soldiers join tribal leaders for a meal. Interaction with tribal leaders is key to success. U.S. Army photo.

ODA 0326 understood that choosing the groups and individuals to engage was likely as important as establishing the relationships themselves. The detachment analyzed the available resources and established contact with three individuals from a U.S. Marine detachment known as Task Force Phoenix. TF Phoenix had had significant interactions with multiple tribes in the province during the previous months and was scheduled to rotate home soon after ODA 0326's arrival. TF Phoenix was deeply involved in establishing the Sons of Iraq, an offshoot of the Awakening Program originally established in Al Anbar Province, employed tribal members in an effort to secure regions within Qadisiyah Province.

Members of ODA 0326 were made aware that they would be working directly with another valuable resource, Lieutenant General Othman Ali Farhoud, commander of the 8th Iraqi Army Division. The general, a tribal sheikh himself, was reported to be one of the most respected and influential personalities in southern Iraq. That influence was attributed to his position within the Iraqi military and his impressive exploits as a soldier, as well as to the leadership role he played within his own tribe. With the assistance and experience of TF Phoenix and General Othman, the ODA strived to identify key individuals and areas of influence that would be most beneficial to accomplishing the ODA's objectives. Upon identifying those factors, the detachment examined any issues likely to occur as a result of conducting engagements. In what sequence would the ODA engage the personalities they identified, in order to pay the proper respect and observe the cultural sensitivities and nuances? Would hostilities arise and be directed at CF as a result of their dealing with two tribes who had



^ TRIBAL MEETING Special-operations Soldiers and their Iraqi counterparts from the 8th Division Iraqi Army meet with local tribal leaders in Hamza, Iraq, to ensure that the needs of the Iraqis are being met. U.S. Army photo.

traditionally been at odds? All of these factors, if handled incorrectly, would likely end any hope of establishing a positive relationship with one or more tribes before the first meeting occurred.

After completing a thorough mission analysis with respect to tribal-engagement operations, ODA 0326 compiled a roster of tribes and individuals thought to be the most vital to the overall success of the mission. Because of the team's limited number of personnel, it could not travel to each tribal leader's remote location during the short itme of its rotation. Establishing any sort of legitimate relationship would require a series of meetings over a span of time. The ODA decided that large-scale meetings were a feasible way to initiate the tribal-engagement process. The detachment was aware that it would take a person of great influence to gather so many powerful individuals, all leaders themselves, to one location. Several members of the detachment met with General Othman and explained what they hoped to accomplish. Upon hearing the detachment's belief that the key to long-term, enduring security in the province

and in southern Iraq lay with the tribal leaders and their people, General Othman appeared elated and stated he would firmly support the detachment's tribal-engagement strategy. He immediately offered to host the initial meeting at a secure location within his Iraqi compound and to personally contact the leaders on the ODA's list of desired attendees in order to encourage them to participate.

On June 19, 2008, ODA 0326 conducted the initial tribal-engagement meeting. The list of attendees included 11 tribal leaders. Each of the leaders represented a different geographic region within Multinational Division Central-South, or MNDCS, in order to quickly gain maximum visibility over the large rural expanse that had received little attention in years past.

ODA members made opening remarks, conveying the detachment's belief that security within the Qadisiyah Province was a task that could be accomplished through increased cooperation between coalition forces and the tribal leaders. The detachment fielded complaints that stemmed from the tribes' past associations with coalition forces. The issues shared by nearly all of the

sheikhs were related to unfulfilled promises by previous coalition forces. The sheikhs complained that they rarely knew the status of proposed projects, received few if any updates, and were often told that the Soldiers they had been dealing with were no longer in the area or even the country. The sheikhs viewed that behavior as disrespectful and felt that the coalition had not taken their tribes seriously. The ODA members stressed to the tribal leaders that they would make no empty promises and would routinely update the leaders on the status of efforts, whether the news was positive or negative. The detachment members emphasized that the ODA's purpose was not to fulfill any particular group or faction's interests but to improve security for all the region's citizens. The tribal leaders conferred for several tense minutes before announcing to the ODA that they would welcome their assistance in the province and would assist by any means at their disposal. Following the meeting, the ODA members sensed they were on probation, likely to be treated with skepticism and mistrust until they proved their effectiveness.

search parties that targeted the individuals responsible for the attack. The search parties frequently located the point of origin for the attacks and reported their findings to coalition forces. Frequent engagements in the region's rural areas also gave the detachment and its attached Tactical Psychological Operations Team 9B34 a venue for conveying their PSYOP messages in new territory.

Those messages had a positive impact on recruiting for Iraqi army and police and bolstered a positive image of the coalition forces operating in the region. Through the engagements, ODA 0326 was able to establish relationships with many influential individuals who controlled the issuing of warrants within Qadisiyah Province. As the government of Iraq, or GOI, continued its progress toward democracy, provinces that demonstrated success were granted the status of being a province under Iraqi control, or PIC. Once Qadisiyah Province had achieved PIC status in July 2008, coalition forces and Iraqi forces required an Iraqi-sanctioned warrant in order to detain an Iraqi citizen for any reason. Through the ODA's association with influential Iraqis

"The face-to-face meetings, meals and the SF Soldiers' demonstrations of respect for tribal customs and culture ... laid the groundwork for obtaining timely intelligence and accurate atmospherics critical to supporting combat operations in Qadisiyah Province and all of southern Iraq."

Members of the detachment wasted no time circulating throughout the province in order to obtain firsthand knowledge of the tribes' situations and to provide humanitarian assistance. These engagements proved valuable on multiple levels. The lengthy and frequent patrols gave the detachment a familiarization with the AO that they would not have obtained otherwise. The tribal leaders guaranteed the detachment safe passage along the MND-CS roads, which were heavily mined with IEDs and explosively formed projectiles, or EFPs. While many of the neighboring coalition units in and around the detachment's AO sustained IED and EFP attacks, during more than 100 combat patrols, ODA 0326 was never struck.

On repeated occasions, following mortar and rocket attacks against Camp Echo, the coalition base co-located with the 8th Iraqi Army Division, tribal leaders used their influence to get immediate results for coalition forces. Tribal leaders in the immediate vicinity of the attacks would provide information as well as quick-response

prior to the PIC transition, the members of the ODA established methods of cooperation that allowed them to obtain warrants virtually unimpeded. Other units within the coalition did not enjoy the same success and experienced a decreased ability to conduct operations following PIC transition, primarily because of the difficulty in navigating the warrant process.

The months just before the January 2009 provincial elections were a time of extreme political sensitivity. Qadisiyah is a province traditionally under the control of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, also known as the Badr political party, which tends to favor Iran. Members of ODA 0326 witnessed firsthand the formation of multiple GOI-sponsored tribal political parties. Those tribal parties were the only viable political competition to the presence of the Badr party and the Sadrist Islamist national movement. By coincidence, the majority of the individuals chosen to lead these tribal political parties were the same leaders the detachment had been engaging. The direct access



△ GETTING FRIENDLY A Soldier greets a tribal leader prior to discussing needs of the people. U.S. Army photo.

thus gained to the newly formed parties not only gave the ODA members an unparalleled understanding of tribal platforms and agendas but also assisted them in bringing about a dramatic increase in tribal participation in the political process.

The face-to-face meetings, meals and the SF Soldiers' demonstrations of respect for tribal customs and culture endeared ODA 0326 to the tribes of Oadisivah and laid the groundwork for obtaining timely intelligence and accurate atmospherics critical to supporting combat operations in the Qadisiyah Province and all of southern Iraq. Through the tribal ties it established, ODA 0326 was able to facilitate initial clearing operations in the city of Amarah, in Maysan Province. Amarah and its adjacent border to Iran were reported to be one of the points of illegal entry most heavily used by foreign and Iraqi insurgents. To overcome the lack of actionable intelligence from Amarah, the ODA members used their tribal associations to engage some of the most influential tribal leaders of the Maysan Province. On June 21, 2008, as coalition forces planned decisive combat operations, several members of ODA 0326 met with nine tribal sheikhs from Amarah and its surrounding villages.

Assuming significant risk for meeting in secret with the coalition forces, the tribal leaders felt compelled to take action to prevent their city from becoming what one sheikh referred to as "another Basra, Mosul or Najaf." In the past, large-scale clearing operations in urban settings had proved costly and destructive when opposed by heavily-entrenched Iraqi insurgent militias. Through the meeting and others that followed, the parties developed target lists and strategies that led to the capture of high-value targets, the surrender of thousands of pounds of munitions and weapons and the removal of previously-emplaced EFPs along major avenues of approach. ODA 0326's tribal-engagement strategy garnered the cooperation of the tribal leaders within the Maysan Province and, thereby, served to significantly enhance security, minimize collateral damage and wrest control of the city from foreign Shiite insurgents and return it to the Iraqi people.

CJSOTF-AP has long known the effectiveness of tribal-engagement operations. Between early 2007 and late 2008, CJSOTF-AP, with a force just over brigade strength, conducted more than 3,000 such tribal-engagement meetings. Its efforts to accommplish thousands of those meetings validates the priority and importance of tribal engagement to CJSOTF-AP.

By demonstrating to members of a foreign population that they have a sincere desire to obtain a ground-truth understanding of the situations shaping the lives of its citizens, U.S. forces can produce a dramatic increase in opportunities for cooperation and mutual support. In an environment as diverse as Iraq, trust and understanding can be gained only through firsthand engagements with the populace. The tribal population will likely continue to reflect the foundational beliefs and opinions of the general citizen, offering one of the most valuable venues for achieving mission success.

Staff Sergeant Devin X. Reagan, an SF

communications sergeant assigned to ODA 0326, was the driving force for the planning and execution of the most expansive tribal-engagement strategy in the Mid-Euphrates Region during OIF VI.

Captain Mike Lueckeman served during Operation Iraqi Freedom III as a reconnaissance platoon leader and Infantry rifle platoon leader with the 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, operating in Mosul, Iraq. During Operation Iraqi Freedom VI, he served as the detachment commander for SF ODA 0326 in Diwaniyah, Iraq.

On the BORDER

With all the media attention devoted to the operations and successes of drug-trafficking organizations, or DTOs, in Mexico and Colombia, little has been

said about the plight of neighboring nations that find

themselves becoming corridors for DTO logistics.

One such nation is Guatemala, where DTOs seek to establish permanent operations, not only to ensure a strategic rear effort for their cartels in Mexico but also to establish forward operations for the "Bandas Criminales" from Colombia. The incursion by DTOs has created a network of sanctuaries, safe havens and financial lines and has spawned corruption, assassinations, violence and kidnappings in key regions of Guatemala.

The periphery of a drug war

In an effort to assist the Guatemalan administration in thwarting a growing DTO threat, United States

7th Group Advises Guatemalan Security Forces to Strengthen the Border

by Major Art Garffer

government agencies are
working with the Guatemalan
Division of Anti-narcotic Information
and Analysis, or DAIA. As part of that
operation, Special Forces Operational
Detachment-Alpha 7123 was tasked
with training, advising and assisting the
Guatemalan "Grupo Especial de Interdicción and Rescate," or GEIR, and the "Fuerzas
Especiales Policiacas," or FEP, while integrating
their efforts with those of the DAIA.

Operating from the austere and DTO-controlled Guatemalan department of Peten, ODA 7123 set up camp alongside its GEIR and FEP hosts on a small base outside the town of Poptun. The local populace still remembers the 36-year civil war, which ended in 1996, during which the Guatemalan military was used inappropriately by a number of dictators. As a result, the ODA's mission of training and advising also had a more sensitive aspect of enhancing the GEIR and FEP's acceptance by the populace. ODA 7123 also worked to dissipate a quiet distrust of U.S. forces that lingers as a result of U.S. involvement in the civil war.

Having redeployed from Operation Enduring Freedom only four months earlier, ODA 7123 set about the task of developing a joint Guatemalan force. The force would have to be capable of training itself and other Guatemalan specialized units while taking the narcotics war to DTO safe havens. It would also need to develop



^ SUPPLY AND DEMAND In addition to tactical training, Guatemalan forces learn to forecast supply needs and develop logistics management plans in order to sustain forces during operations. *U.S. Army photo.*

organic intelligence and information capabilities that would allow it to prosecute effects-oriented target sets.

Training foreign special-operations forces, or SOF, is always a challenge but a welcome one. While ODA members were linguistically proficient, the challenge in training the GEIR and FEP stemmed from those units' "battle rhythm," as they were occasionally called on by the Guatemalan SOF Command to interrupt their training and deploy on a real-world mission. ODA members had to be flexible enough to adapt the training schedule to the changing operational tempo while ensuring the success of the overarching mission.

While the GEIR and FEP consistently demonstrated the will to fight, their potential for success was hindered by the other Guatemalan commands' reduced ability to provide logistics and maneuver support. On the logistics side, the ODA provided the bulk of the ammunition for training, but it was critical that the Guatemalans be able to sustain their forces logistically during operations. The ODA leaders worked with the other Guatemalan commands to develop management

plans that addressed forecasting classes of supply while budgeting limited finances.

To assist with maneuver support, the ODA leaders contacted members of Advanced Operating Base 7120 in Honduras to acquire rotary-wing aircraft support from the assets of Joint Task Force-Bravo, or JTF-B. JTF-B's assistance enhanced the troops' maneuverability onto targets, allowed them to execute operations of an aerial-reconnaissance force, or ARF, and provided a platform for the insertion and extraction of reconnaissance forces.

Operating tactically

In order to continue to foster the GEIR and FEP's will to fight, the SFODA leaders developed a two-pronged approach to ensure that its efforts attained the regional and strategic objectives of the U.S. Southern Command and that those efforts nested with those of the U.S. Northern Command in Mexico.

The initial approach was on the tactical level. First, SFODA members incorporated the FEP into the training

and operations of the GEIR. Integrating FEP into troops put organic state police forces on the targets, setting the condition for immediate legal and judicial execution and sensitive site exploitation, as witnessed during Operation Choc Tuc against the Beltran-Leyva cartel.

A second effort on the tactical level was to develop an organic reconnaissance capability that would generate "bottom-up" intelligence. This was used during three operations: one in the Peten Department, one on the border with Mexico (netting more than a ton of narcotics), and one affecting the efforts of the Zeta cartel. ico and developed fields of crops for local consumption. In response, the SF ODA, working with the AOB and the leaders of the CA civil-military support element and the PSYOP mobile information support team, quickly developed a plan for influencing the populace.

First, it was important that the populace see a Guatemalan-government presence in the region. All elements agreed that the Centro de Adiestramiento del Ejercito and the Guatemalan Ministry of Health could conduct a four-week series of medical civic-action programs that would be key to the expansion of govern-

"The second approach was on the operational level. SF ODA leaders identified a key force-multiplier component that was lacking: the use of 'soft power' — co-opting instead of coercing — to shape what will be a prolonged effort against DTOs in Guatemala, especially within the Peten Department."

A third tactical effort was developing flexible elements of the GEIR and FEP for immediate deployment as ARFs in conjunction with JTF-B rotary-wing assets. The force was critical in raiding clandestine flight landing sites in the vicinity of the Salinas River and destabilizing the DTO in the region. Finally, the SFODA focused much of the training on enhancing the GEIR and FEP's use of the military decision-making process to ensure that solid planning would precede every training event and operation. Through a methodical tactical approach, the SFODA, GEIR and FEP attained tangible and coherent effects during Operations Initial Strike I and II.

Operating operationally

The second approach was on the operational level. SF ODA leaders identified a key force-multiplier component that was lacking: the use of "soft power" — coopting instead of coercing — to shape what will be a prolonged effort against DTOs in Guatemala, specifically within the Peten Department. The detachment commander requested the assistance of Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations assets from AOB 7120 in order to slowly cut away at the DTOs' increasing control over the local populace as a result of an inadequate civil-government presence.

With almost unlimited funding and no government presence to impede their actions, the DTOs had established a recruiting program along the border with Mexment influence into the Peten Department. The Guatemalan and U.S. SOF efforts resulted in the treatment of more than 2,000 patients and 340 animals.

These efforts developed inroads into the region and maintained them, fostering and enhancing rapport. The presence and activity of the Guatemalan government was clearly evident, setting the stage for operational information to be shared with local authorities and eventually the GEIR. These efforts set the foundation for simultaneous and continuous operations affecting the DTOs' control of the Peten Department.

Conclusion

The detachment's efforts in Guatemala, coupled with solid working relationships between key personnel of the U.S. Embassy and Guatemalan security forces, greatly enhanced the U.S. SOUTHCOM commander's achievement of strategic and regional end-states for Central America. In addition, the detachment's successes were closely monitored by U.S. NORTHCOM and the Joint Interagency Task Force-South, ensuring nesting and synchronization of efforts, according to U.S. SOUTHCOM deputy commander, Lieutenant General Purl K. Keen, during a visit with the AOB and the SFODA.

The will of the Guatemalan GEIR and other forces to fight is clearly evident. The mission of foreign internal defense is critical to the stability of Guatemala and to U.S. efforts to disrupt DTOs' long-term ventures, invest-



A BORDER PATROL Guatemalan GEIR, FEP and DAIA must work together and form a united front to protect Guatemala's borders from drug trafficking. U.S. Army photo.

ment and destabilizing efforts. As we continue to advise Mexico on its current war on DTs, it is critical that we continue to support the Guatemalan GEIR, FEP and DAIA in order to deny DTOs freedom of movement and sanctuaries there.

The DTOs' threat is clear, and their ability to operate can be thwarted only through increased advisory activities. One recommendation is that we co-opt the Indian tribes of Peten and later expand that influence to other tribes in neighboring departments. During the period 1970-1989, U.S. SF developed a very similar approach with the Kuna and Embera tribes in Panama, and those efforts came to fruition prior to and during Operation Just Cause. SW

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Major Art Garffer is assigned to the G3, U.S. Army Special Operations Command. He was formerly commander of Company B, 1st Battalion, 7th SF Group, and commanded AOB 7120 in Honduras. His service included 10 months in Colombia and four in Panama. He also served in the 3rd SF Group as a detachment commander, company executive officer and assistant battalion S3 in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Major Garffer holds a master's in international relations from Troy State University and an master's in finance from the Universidad Interamericana de Puerto Rico.

NCOs

2011 MSG promotion board scheduled

The fiscal year 2011 master sergeant promotion-selection board will convene Oct. 26. NCOs in the zone for consideration for the board should ensure that their records are up-to-date and validate their Enlisted Record Brief and Official Military Personnel Folder for accuracy and make arrangements to have a new DA photo taken. For more information about the board, refer to the most current MILPER message or telephone Jeanne Goldmann at DSN 239-6922 or commercial (910) 432-6922.

Civil Affairs looking for qualified Soldiers

Civil Affairs continues to recruit qualified Soldiers who meet the prerequisites listed in DA Pam 611-21, *Military Occupational Classification and Structure*. Soldiers must now have completed the Warrior Leader Course prior to application. The next CA accession board will be held Aug. 6 to fill classes in the third and fourth quarters of FY 2010. This year's accession board will not

accept applications from sergeants first class or promotable staff sergeants, but that may change in FY 2011 with the growth of the 85th Civil Affairs Brigade.

To obtain more information, Soldiers can visit the following link: https://perscomnd04.army.mil/ MOSMARTBK.nsf/. Sign in using AKO user ID and password, then go to Chapter 10, 38B. Soldiers who are interested in reclassifying into CA should contact SFC Robert Herring or SFC Dennis Pease at the Special Operations Recruiting Battalion, located on Fort Bragg on Macomb Street (Building 2-1120), or telephone (910) 432- 9697 or DSN 239-9697. Send e-mail to: robert.herring@usarec.army.mil or dennis.pease@usarec.army.mil.

POCs for CMF 18

Soldiers who would like more information about CMF 18 recruiting can contact SFC Kyle at the Special Operations Recruiting Battalion, telephone DSN 239-9710 or commercial (910) 432-9710.

For questions related to the 18X program, contact SFC Seth Long,

18X career manager, at DSN 239-7359, commercial (910) 432-7359, or send e-mail to: longs@soc.mil.

For any other questions related to CMF 18, contact MSG Pedro Padilla, senior career manager, at DSN 239-6995, commercial (910) 432-6995, or send e-mail to: pedro.i.padillamendez @soc.mil.

Slots available in CA NCOES classes

The JFK Special Warfare Center and School's NCO Academy has slots available for the Civil Affairs Advanced Leadership Course and CA Senior Leadership Course. Soldiers should contact their chain of command and schools NCO for class dates and to reserve seats.

Soldiers can check on CA assignments

CA Soldiers who wish to explore new assignments should contact SFC (P) Dumas, Civil Affairs assignment manager, at (502) 613-9843, or the Civil Affairs senior career manger. MSG Ralph Weller, at (910) 907-4171 or wellerr@ahqb. soc.mil.

WE WANT TO HEAR FROM YOU...

The *Special Warfare* staff needs your help to make this the best publication it can be. Drop us a line and let us know your ideas and opinions about the concept and design of the magazine.

- > What do you like?
- > What do you dislike?
- > Do you have any comments about the articles?
- > What would you like to see in future issues?
- > Are there any issues you want to discuss that may not require a magazine article?
- > Just tell us what's on your mind.

SEND LETTERS TO:

Editor, Special Warfare; Attn: AOJK-DTD-MP; JFK Special Warfare Center and School

Fort Bragg, NC 28310

E-MAIL:

steelman@soc.mil

Include your full name, rank, address and phone number with all submissions. Articles dealing with a specific operation should be reviewed for security through the author's chain of command.

Warrant Officer

SF Warrant Officers Needed for Active and Reserve Components

Special Forces NCOs who seek greater opportunities can apply to become SF warrant officers. Some opportunities available are:

- Serving in a direct, ground-combat leadership role as the assistant detachment commander of a detachment.
- Spending an average of five additional years on a detachment.
- Leading specialized teams in advanced special operations, counterterrorism, Psychological Operations, Civil Affairs and other missions, as directed.
- Serving in joint, strategic, operational and tactical assignments at all levels of planning and execution of special operations worldwide.
- A critical skills accessions bonus of \$20,000 for eligible active-duty Soldiers and \$10,000 for members of the National Guard.

For more information, go to www.usarec.army.mil/hq/warrant or http://www.1800goguard.com/warrantofficer/warrant.html. Applicants can also get assistance by contacting the unit senior warrant officer or by contacting CW3 Bobby Craig in the Directorate of Force Management: DSN 239-7597, commercial (910) 432-7597, or send e-mail to craigb@ahqb.soc.mil.

Promotion stats for SF warrants beats Army average

During 2010, SF warrant officers have been selected for promotion at a rate slightly higher than the Army average. Averages for SF warrant officers are shown in the table below:

Rank	1004	Other
	180A	MOS
CW5	38%	34%
CW4	95%	84%
CW3	100%	90%

The higher promotion rates are attributed to the quality of SF warrant officers' files.

Special Forces Warrant Officer Advanced Course (WOAC) Distance Learning (Phase I)

Beginning with Special Forces Warrant Officer Advanced Course 001-12, which will start in January 2012, SF warrants will be required to complete the distance learning, or DL, portion of SFWOAC before receiving orders to attend the resident portion.

Students will have up to 12 months from the date of enrollment to complete the DL portion. Warrant officers who wish to attend Class 001-12 should submit a DA Form 4187, through their chain of command, in October 2010 to ensure they have the maximum allowable time to complete the DL portion. Students must enroll at least six months prior to the course start date in order to meet the minimum requirement.

The optimal time for SF warrant officers to attend SFWOAC is when they have from one to three years' time in grade. All CW2s and CW3s who have not yet attended SFWOAC should schedule attendance as soon as possible.

Officer

Deadline nears for retroactive joint-qualification assessment

Active-duty officers who require a retroactive assessment of their joint qualification for assignments between Sept. 11, 2001, and Sept. 30, 2009, must request the assessment before Oct. 1.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 requires officers to have joint education and experience, and joint qualification is an important part of an officer's professional development. The Joint Qualification System, or JQS, provides officers an opportunity to earn joint qualification upon completion of their requisite joint professional military education and a tour of duty in a joint assignment.

Officers self-nominate by submitting their joint experience via the JQS Web site (https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/jmis/JQSLoginMain.do). Begin-

ning Oct. 1, JQS will require activeduty officers to file for any retroactive assessment within one year of the completion date of their joint assignment, which will eliminate consideration for any assignment completed before Sept. 30, 2009.

The Army Reserve and National Guard will implement a later deadline because of the difficulty Reserve and National Guard officers have in accumulating JQS points. Reserve and National Guard officers will have through 2013 to file for assessment of joint assignments dating back to 1986. Their retroactive date goes further back because the 2007 Congressional modification to the Defense Reorganization Act applied only to active-duty officers.

After 2013, Reserve and National Guard officers will also have up to one

year from the completion date of their joint assignment to submit their self-nomination into JQS. Under certain circumstances, Reserve officers can also get joint credit for attending joint-military-education courses.

For additional information from the Army Human Resources Command, those with questions related to colonels' JQS submissions should telephone John Ruchala at (703) 696-5222 or DSN 426-5222, or send e-mail to: john. ruchala@us.army.mil. For questions on all other active-duty officer submissions, telephone Joseph M. Palermo at (703) 325-8129, DSN 221-8129, or send e-mail to: joseph.m.palermo@us.army.mil. The HRC point of contact for Army Reserve officers is Major Mary Lepley, (314) 592-0094; e-mail: mary. lepley@us.army.mil.

JUNGLE OF SNAKES:

A Century of Counterinsurgency Warfare from the Philippines to Iraq

Over the last nine years, debate over the utility, purpose and consequences of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan has drawn the attention of pundits and armchair generals alike. Yet few truly understand the implications of counterinsurgency operations, often mistaking our current war as a unique problem that demands a unique solution. Proposed solutions abound — some viable and valuable, others merely the talk of the uninformed.

Former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency James Woolsey once exclaimed, "It is as if we were struggling with a large dragon for 45 years, killed it, and then found ourselves in a jungle full of poisonous snakes." From that statement, James Arnold, a noted historian and author of more than 20 books, draws the title of his historical analysis of counterinsurgency warfare, Jungle of Snakes: A Century of Counterinsurgency Warfare from the Philippines to Iraq.

Arnold's is not the average history book. He uses history to demonstrate that insurgency and a state's efforts to suppress it are historical realities, demonstrating that counterinsurgency must be studied with the attention of a historian and the vigor of a strategist. Arnold observes that contemporary counterinsurgencies are "fundamentally an information fight ... Jungle of Snakes seeks to contribute to the information fight." As a basis for understanding the differences between high- and low-intensity warfare and counterinsurgency, Arnold's book provides an excellent and authoritative primer.


The book begins with a concise outline of counterinsurgency warfare. Through the lens of history, Arnold explains the challenges involved in counterinsurgency. Arnold makes the case that one can view counterinsurgency warfare as a model for future conflict. To illustrate that argument, Arnold examines four significant counterinsurgencies from the

last century: two successes and two failures.

Arnold's first case study is the Philippine Insurrection of 1899 to 1902, in which he points out that the U.S. Army, in its first significant counterinsurgent war, got it right, but not without significant political and military consequences. In the end, the war was an American victory and a pertinent, though little recognized, historical model of counterinsurgency. In his second case study, Arnold analyzes the war in Algeria, considered a French defeat, by outlining the importance of the civil-military relationship. In the third case study, Arnold looks at the Malayan Emergency and the victory of the British and the government of Malaya. Finally, Arnold revisits the American Vietnam War as an example of what not to do. With that, Arnold begins his analysis.

In the book's title, Arnold purports to present an analysis of counterinsurgency from the Philippines to Iraq, although his historical analysis stops with the Vietnam War. To overcome that minor shortcoming, Arnold concludes with a reflection on the current situation. He acknowledges that from the outset of the current conflicts, there has been a stark transformation in the lethality and capability of our insurgent enemy, pointing out, "Technological advances shape this irregular, but always upward, path of lethality."

Finally, Arnold explains that information makes the current war more personal and real to the public. Atrocities are broadcast in near-real-time, perhaps making this war unique in its understatement of its own lethality. In the end, Arnold explains, if we commit to this type of warfare, history demands that we prepare ourselves for a significant and protracted commitment of blood and treasure. He concludes, "The lessons of history and the case studies in this book do not necessarily refute the belief that an insurgency cannot be defeated by



DETAILS

James R. Arnold

New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2009. ISBN: 978-1-59691-503-9 (Hardback) 291 pages. \$20.44.

Reviewed by:

Major Christopher O'Gwin U.S. Army Naval Postgraduate School

an outside, foreign force. A strategic doctrine can be built that provides a path to victory."

In order to understand the book's value, it is important to understand that it is a history of counterinsurgencies, not a book of solutions. Its analysis is basic, geared for citizens and Soldiers unfamiliar with counterinsurgency. However, there is tremendous value in its side-by-side review of case studies. As Arnold points out, common themes emerge, providing insight to current problems.

Overall, the book's utility is found in its simplicity. Diplomatic and military professionals will find its observations relevant and useful, and the curious reader will establish a base of understanding. While it does not contain new ideas and theories, its case studies provide insight into the past that may provide clarity for the future. It is a worthy read and a complement to any counterinsurgent's library.

Department of the Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School ATTN: AOJK-DTD-MP 2175 Reilly Road, Stop A Fort Bragg, NC 28310

